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Recent Developments.

Vacco v. Quill:

T

he United States Supreme
Court, in Vacco v. Quill,
117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), upheld on
Equal Protection grounds a New
York statute making it a crime to
assist another in committing
suicide. In upholding the New
York
statute,
the
Court
distinguished between refusing
life-sustaining treatment and
assisting suicide.
The Court
determined that the state's
interest in preserving human life
outweighs a patient's liberty
interest
in
controlling
the
circumstances of his death. The
same day the Court decided
Vacca v. Quill, the Court also
decided
Washington
v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997). In Glucksberg, the Court
decided
that
Washington's
assisted suicide statute did not
violate the Due Process Clause of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
because assisted suicide is not a
fundamental right. The concurring
opinions dis-cussed below are
common to both Vacca and
Glucksberg.
Respondents ("Quill"), New
York physicians, sought to prescribe lethal medication for the
terminally ill. Because of the New
York statute banning assisted
suicide, respondents contended
that they were deterred from
assisting terminally ill patients who
desired a doctor's aid in taking
their own lives. The respondents'
argument was based on the
classification differences in New
York statutes that allow a
competent person to refuse lifesustaining treatment, but do not
allow a competent, terminally ill
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person to end his life through the
administration of lethal drugs.
According to the respondents, a
competent, terminally ill patient
who desires to end his life through
the ingestion of lethal medication
should be afforded the same
statutory protection as a patient
who refuses or withdraws lifesustaining treatment.
Challenging
the assisted
suicide statute as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Quill and
three terminally ill patients (who
wished to end their lives and who
have since died) sued the New
York Attorney General and other
public officials in the United States
District Court for the Southern
District of New York. Noting the
state's interest in preserving life,
the district court upheld the New
York statute.
Quill appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Observing the
unequal treatment given to
competent terminally ill patients,
the court of appeals reversed.
The court of appeals noted that
terminally ill patients may refuse
or
withdraw
life-sustaining
treatments in order to hasten

death, while terminally ill patients
who are not on life support may
not administer drugs to hasten
death. The court held that the
distinction was not rationally
related to a legitimate state
interest.
The United States Supreme
Court granted
certiorari to
determine whether the New York
statute prohibiting assisted suicide
violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Vacca, 117 S. Ct. at 2296.
Chief Justice Renquist began by
analyzing the Equal Protection
Clause, which embodies the rule
that states "must treat like cases
alike, but may treat unlike cases
accordingly." Id. at 2297 (citing
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
(1982». According to the Court, if
a legislative classification "neither
burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will
uphold [it] so long as it bears a
rational relation to some legitimate
end." Id.
(quoting Romer v.
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627
(1996». The Court maintained
that the assisted suicide statute
neither
infringed
upon
a
fundamental right, nor involved a
Id.
(citing
suspect class.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2267-71).
Next, the Court considered the
New York statute banning
assisted suicide (N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987»
and the statutes permitting
patients to refuse life-sustaining
treatment (N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW, Art. 29B § § 2960-2979
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997».
Id.
at 2296.
The Court
determined that the statutes do
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not treat one group of patients
differently from another group of
patients because everyone can
refuse life-sustaining treatment,
while no one can assist a suicide.
Id. at 2297-98. Concluding that
the law applied evenhandedly to
all people, the Court determined
that the assisted suicide statute
complied with the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 2298.
Continuing its analysis, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the
widely recognized and rational
distinction between assisting
suicide and withdrawing lifesustaining treatment. Id. The
legal distinction between assisting
suicide and withdrawing or
withholding life support lay in the
elements of causation and intent.
Id. Addressing the underlying
cause of death, the Court
recognized that when a patient
refuses life-sustaining treatment,
the patient dies from a terminal
illness. Id. On the other hand, if a
patient consumes lethal medication, the patient dies from the
medication, not the disease. Id.
Next, the Court distinguished
between the intent of a doctor who
withholds or withdraws lifesustaining treatment and the
intent of a doctor who assists a
suicide. Id. According to the
Court, the doctor who withholds or
withdraws life-sustaining treatment
intends to honor the patient's
wishes and to stop performing
treatment that is non-beneficial to
the patient. Id. (citing Assisted
Suicide in the United States:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Congress, 2d Session, 386
(testimony of Dr. Leon Krass)
(1996)). Conversely, a doctor
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who assists a suicide has the
underlying intent to cause the
patient to die. Id. at 2299. The
Court further concluded that a
patient who refuses life-sustaining
treatment may not intend to die
while a patient who commits
suicide with a doctor's aid does
intend to die. Id. Although the act
of withholding or withdrawing lifesustaining treatment and the act
of assisting suicide have the same
result, the underlying intent of the
doctor distinguishes the acts. Id.
The Court noted that the law of
homicide "distinguishes between a
person who knows that another
person will be killed as a result of
his conduct and a person who
acts with the specific purpose of
taking another's life." Id. (quoting
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394, 403-06 (1980)). In other
words, the law recognizes a
difference between acts taken to
achieve a specified result versus
acts taken that result in
"unintended
but
foreseen
circumstances."
Id.
(citing
Personnel
Adm'r.
of
Massachusetts. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
The Supreme Court concluded
by
disagreeing
with
the
respondents' contention that the
distinction between withholding or
withdrawing
life-sustaining
treatment and aSSisting suicide is
capricious and illogical. Id. at
2301. According to the Court, the
New York statutes are based on a
longstanding
and
rational
distinction because the statutes
permit everyone to refuse
lifesaving treatment, but prohibit
everyone from assisting a suicide.
Id. Therefore, the Court stated
that a state's interests in
preserving life and prohibiting

intentional killings bore a rational
relation to the distinction between
withdrawing or withholding of lifesustaining treatment and aSSisting
a suicide. Id. at 2302.
Concluding that assisted
suicide was not a fundamental
right, Vacca, 117 S. Ct. at 2302
(Souter, J., concurring), Justice
Souter concurred in the Court's
judgment in Vacca for the same
reasons
he
set
forth
in
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 227593. Justice Souter analogized
assisted suicide to the right to
abortion
because
both
circumstances assume the right to
bodily integrity and involve the role
of the physician as an assistant
and counselor. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. at 2288 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
However, Justice
Souter concluded that the state's
interests in
protecting
life,
discouraging
suicide,
and
protecting patients from involuntary suicide and euthanasia
outweigh the patients' interest in
bodily integrity.
Id.
at 2290
J.,
concurring).
(Souter,
Additionally, Justice Souter noted
the difficulty in assessing when a
patient is competent and acting
under his own will versus when a
patient may be acting under the
pressure imposed by family
members or physicians. Id.
Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justices Ginsberg and Breyer,
concurred with the judgments of
the Court
in
Vacca
and
Glucksberg, but stated that the
justification
for
prohibiting
physician assisted suicide lay in
the state's interest in protecting
terminally ill patients who are not
competent or whose decisions
may
not
be
voluntary.
Glucksberg, 117. Ct. at 2303
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(O'Connor,
J.,
concurring).
According to Justice O'Connor, a
person does not have a
fundamental right to commit
suicide. Thus, Justice O'Connor,
like the majority, purposefully
ignored the question presented by
whether a
the respon"dents:
mentally competent, terminally ill
patient has an interest in
controlling the circumstances of
his death. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
Unlike Justice O'Connor,
Justice Stevens, in his concurring
opinion, agreed with the Court's
distinction between withholding
and withdrawing life support and
assisting suicide. Id. at 2309
(Stevens,
J.,
concurring).
However, Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's focus on
the intent of the patient, noting
that whether the patient refuses
life support or seeks assisted
suicide, the patient is seeking to
hasten death.
Id. at 2310
(Stevens, J., concurring). The
differences in causation and intent
cited by the Court may not be
applicable to all doctors and
patients. Id. Seeming to agree
with the respondents, Justice
Stevens noted that a state's
interest in preventing the abuse of
patient's wishes does not apply to
a competent person who makes a
rational decision to end his life. Id.
at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Acknowledging
the
respondents' argument, Justice
opinion
Breyer's
concurring
focused on the liberty interest of
the patient, specifically, the right
to die with dignity. Id. at 2311
(Breyer, J., concurring).
He

concluded that a person has a
right to control his manner of
death and to avoid unnecessary
pain. Id. Ultimately, however,
Justice Breyer agreed with the
Court's
distinction
between
assisted suicide and withdrawing
life support. Id.
In Vacca v. Quill, 117 S. Ct.
2293 (1997), the United States
Supreme Court held that a New
York statute banning assisted
suicide is not a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth
Amendment.
However, the Court failed to
address the issue presented by
the respondents: whether a
mentally competent, terminally ill
patient has a right to assisted
suicide. The Court determined that
the state's interests in protecting
the vulnerable, the incompetent,
and those under financial or family
pressure to end their lives justified
the prohibition of assisted suicide.
The Court's characterization of
the differences in intent in
assisting suicide and withholding
or withdrawing life support is
illusory. A doctor who assists
suicide by administering lethal
drugs and a doctor who withdraws
or withholds life support may both
be complying with the patient's
request. Similarly, a patient who
desires to be injected with lethal
drugs and a patient who does not
wish to be administered lifesustaining treatments may both be
attempting to ease the suffering. A
competent, terminally ill patient
who desires to ease his suffering
through the ingestion of lethal
medication, assisted by a doctor
who wishes to comply with the

patient's request, could present a
strong challenge to the state's
interests
and
classification
distinctions articulated by the
Court. A court may then be forced
to decide the definition of a
competent patient. Because the
competent patient is conscious of
his suffering, a court may also
have to decide that a competent,
terminally ill patient has a much
greater liberty interest than does a
patient in a persistent vegetative
state in deciding the cause and
circumstances of his death.
As a result of the. Court's
decision, mentally competent,
terminally ill patients may not seek
medical assistance in ending their
own lives, even if treatment or
medication cannot eliminate the
discomfort associated with the
disease. Although none of the
Justices agreed that a patient has
a fundamental right to assisted
suicide, all of the Justices agreed
that every patient has a right to
seek palliative care, even if the
result of such treatment would be
to hasten death. The Court failed
to recognize that palliative care is
often insufficient to reduce a
terminal patient's pain to an
acceptable level of comfort while
allowing the patient to remain
alert.
Frequently, in the final
stages of a disease such as
cancer, the patient can no longer
endure the pain and suffering
associated with the disease,
notwithstanding medication and
treatment. When the suffering
unendurable,
a
becomes
competent patient should be
permitted to hasten death in a
humane and certain manner.
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